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 1 
 
“NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE A BULLY: WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
PRINCIPLE OF CONTENT NEUTRALITY SHOULD APPLY WITH LESS FORCE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF REGULATING BULLYING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS” 
 
BY PAOLA A. GUIDO 
 
“The problem of bullying has been shrouded in myth and misunderstanding for 
far too many years. As educators . . . we simply have not taken the problem of bullying 
seriously enough . . . [it]is very much an education priority that goes to the heart of 
school performance and school culture.” 
 
United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.
1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the fall of 2012, almost fifty million students attended U.S. public elementary and 
secondary schools.
2
 Studies indicate that twenty to thirty percent of students in grades six 
through twelve are victims of bullying at school.
3
 Since February 2012, approximately forty-
eight states have enacted legislation against student speech that constitutes bullying.
4
 The recent 
surge of interest in anti-bullying legislation and research has been attributed to the public outcry 
against bullying-related student suicides.
5
 In August 2010, the U.S. Departments of Education, 
                                                        
1 Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Education, The Myths About Bullying: Remarks at the Bullying Prevention Summit 
(Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/myths-about-bullying-secretary-arne-duncans-
remarks-bullying-prevention-summit. 
2 Participation in Education: Elementary/Secondary Enrollment, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES – NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/tables/table-enl-
1.asp.   
3 Bullying: Overview, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, 
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/bullying/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Nov. 30, 2012). 
4 The only states without an anti-bullying law are Montana and South Dakota. John T. Ceglia, The Disappearing 
Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 872 (2012) (internal citation omitted). 
5 Ramin Setoodeh, Phoebe Prince’s Legacy: A Town Tries to Heal, PEOPLE, Oct. 18, 2010, available at 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20432959,00.html; Brett Smiley, Harlem Boy Commits Suicide 
After Relentless Bullying, N.Y. MAG., May 23, 2012, available at http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/05/harlem-boy-
commits-suicide-after-harsh-bullying.html; Rachel Ehmke, 13-Year-Old Minnesota Student, Commits Suicide After 
Months Of Bullying, HUFFINGTON POST, May 8, 2012, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/08/rachel-ehmke-13-year-old-_n_1501143.html; Jamey Rodemeye, 14-
Year Old Boy, Commits Suicide After Gay Bullying, Parents Carry On Message, HUFFINGTON POST, May 20, 2011, 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/jamey-rodemeyer-suicide-gay-bullying_n_972023.html; 
See Samantha Neiman, Brandon Robers, Simone Robers, Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 609 
(citing Swearer et al., What can be done about school bullying? Linking Research to Educational Practice, 39 
EDUC. RESEARCHER 38, 38 (2010)). 
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Health and Human Services, Agriculture, the Interior, and Justice sponsored the Federal National 
Bullying Summit in Washington, D.C.
6
 Secretary of Education Arne Duncan announced the 
purpose of this federal summit, the first on the issue, as a “launch [of the] sustained commitment 
to address and reduce bullying.”7 However, no federal law currently exists that addresses 
bullying directly.
8
 Instead, bullying may constitute discriminatory harassment, which is 
addressed by several federal civil rights laws.
9
 When bullying is based on race, national origin, 
color, sex, age, disability, or religion, it may violate one of these laws. A school that receives 
federal funding has an obligation to address and remedy the harassment.
10
 
On January 5, 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed the Anti-Bullying Bill of 
Rights Act into law.
 11
 New Jersey is one of the many states that have enacted or recently 
strengthened their anti-bullying statutes. Labeled the country’s “toughest law against bullying 
and harassment in schools,”12 it was enacted just months after the tragic suicide of Tyler 
Clementi, a Rutgers University undergraduate student who was bullied by his peers for his 
                                                        
6 Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention Summit, JUVENILE JUSTICE VERMONT, 
http://www.juvenilejusticevt.org/juvenile-justice/federal-partners-in-bullying-prevention-summit/. 
7 Duncan, supra note 1. 
8 Anti-bullying legislation has been proposed at the national level on numerous occasions during the last decade. In 
2004, federal anti-bullying legislation was proposed in the House of Representatives as an amendment to the Safe 
and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act. H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. (2004). In 2009, a bill 
was introduced in the House of Representatives titled, “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.” H.R. 1966, 
111th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Session 2009). An amendment to the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act was 
re-introduced in 2009. H.R. 2262, 111th Cong. (2009). In 2011, the Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2011 was 
introduced in the Senate. H.R. 1648, 112th Cong. (2011). 
9 Some examples include: Title IV and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7 (2012); Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012); Titles II and III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012). 
10 Federal Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/federal (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
11 Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.2 (West 2010).  
12 Richard Perez Pena, Christie Signs Tougher Law on Bullying in Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/nyregion/07bully.html?_r=0; See also Emmeline Zhao, New Jersey’s Anti-
Bullying Law, Toughest in Country Garners Praise and Criticism, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/new-jerseys-anti-bullying_n_946625.html (“The law . . . is said to be 
the toughest piece of anti-bullying legislation in the country.”) (last updated Nov. 2, 2011, 6:12 AM). 
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sexuality.
13
 According to the New Jersey Department of Education, the intent of the anti-bullying 
legislation is to “strengthen standards and procedures for preventing, reporting, investigating and 
responding to HIB [harassment, intimidation and bullying] incidents of students in school and off 
school premises.”14 The law requires school districts to follow specialized protocols in reporting 
and investigating all bullying complaints.
15
  
States, local governments, and school districts, in attempting to resolve the ongoing 
bullying crisis within our public school systems, are enacting anti-bullying laws and policies that 
may infringe on students’ First Amendment rights. In the implementation of these laws, school 
administrators must balance the need to protect their students’ emotional and physical well-being 
with their constitutional First Amendment rights. Critics have attacked the New Jersey anti-
bullying statute on various First Amendment grounds. One commentator perceives the statute as 
potentially overbroad in its definition of prohibited conduct.
16
 He also estimates the law could 
infringe upon religious and political freedoms of students.
17
  
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Supreme Court held that a public school 
cannot punish a student’s speech unless it “‘materially and substantially interfer[es] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with 
the rights of others.”18 Many of the present anti-bullying laws codify or somehow incorporate the 
                                                        
13 Tyler committed suicide on September 22, 2010. He was an 18-year old freshman at Rutgers who grew up in 
Ridgewood, New Jersey. Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
29, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?ref=tylerclementi.  
14 Guidance for Schools on Implementing the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (P.L. 2010, c.122), N.J. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., 6 (Dec. 2011), http://www.nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/guidance.pdf.  
15 See Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15. 
16 Derek Bambauer, Cyberbullying and the Cheese-Eating Surrender Monkeys, CONCURRING OPINIONS, (Feb. 21, 
2012, 10:20 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/02/cyberbullying-and-the-cheese-eating-
surrender-monkeys.html. Professor Bambauer was a panelist at the Seton Hall Legislative Journal’s 2012 
Symposium titled, “Bullying and the Social Media Generation: the Effects of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Statute 
on School Administration, Students, and Teachers.” 
17 Id. 
18 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 4 
Tinker standard for regulating student speech in public schools.
19
 Some of these laws, including 
New Jersey’s, also permit school officials to punish off-campus bullying.20 New Jersey’s 
recently amended anti-bullying law incorporates the Tinker standard by requiring that the bully’s 
speech “substantially disrupt[] or interfere[] with the orderly operation of the school or the rights 
of other students.”21 
One of the most important critiques of the New Jersey anti-bullying law is that it is a 
content-based restriction.
22
 This federal First Amendment principle of content neutrality requires 
that the government be a neutral arbiter in regulating all speech, even when it is unprotected. The 
Supreme Court has clarified that the government cannot pick and choose what it will punish even 
though it is punishing unprotected speech. Instead of prohibiting all bullying that is proscribable 
and unprotected under Tinker, the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights enumerates certain 
                                                        
19 See Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-
18-514(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2007) (prohibiting bullying “[b]y an electronic act that results in the substantial disruption 
of the orderly operation of the school or educational environment”); Safe School Climate Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-
63-120(1)(b) (Supp. 2008) (prohibiting bullying when it causes “substantial disruption in, or substantial interference 
with, the orderly operation of the school”). 
20 § 18A:37-14 (requiring school officials to report bullying that “takes place on school property, at any school-
sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds.”). 
21 Id. 
22 See Part I for a discussion of the content neutrality principle and its application in the realm of student speech in 
public schools. 
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characteristics that may motivate a student to harass, intimidate or bully another student.
23
 Some 
states have enacted similar anti-bullying laws with enumerated characteristics.
24
  
This Note will focus on the issue of the New Jersey law’s potential violation of the 
principle of content neutrality. It will discuss whether the regulation of student speech in public 
schools is subject to the principle of content neutrality. This Note argues that the principle of 
content neutrality, in the realm of independent student speech that causes a substantial disruption 
under Tinker, should be relaxed when dealing with the regulation of bullying. Specially, this 
Note will focus on New Jersey’s revised anti-bullying law. Content discrimination should be 
permitted in this context because bullying is a serious impediment to the state’s ability to carry 
out its educational mission. Further, the school setting involves a “captive” audience similar to 
that of the workplace setting, where the Supreme Court has held that since the public workplace 
environment involves a “captive” audience,25 the important public policies that govern such an 
environment “may justify some limitations on the free speech rights of employers and 
                                                        
23 Id. (The statute punishes “any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic communication, 
whether it be a single incident or a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any 
actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by another other distinguishing 
characteristic that takes place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school 
grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or interferes 
with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students and that . . . a reasonable person should know, 
under the circumstances, will have the effect of physically or emotionally harming a student or damaging the 
student's property, or placing a student in reasonable fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or damage to 
his property; [] has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or group of students; or [] creates a hostile 
educational environment for the student by interfering with a student’s education or by severely or pervasively 
causing physical or emotional harm to the student.”).  
24 See e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.79(a) (West Supp 2011) (punishing bullying based on “race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual 
orientation, gender-related identity or expression, unfavorable discharge from military service”); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 
12(1) (prohibiting “acts based on a person's actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, 
religion, religious practice, disability, sexual orientation, gender or sex.”). 
25 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (holding that the public employee’s speech did not raise an issue of 
public concern, and explaining that “the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable 
for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (holding the 
Hatch Act prohibition against federal employees taking an active part in political management or in political 
campaigns did not violate the employees’ First Amendment rights as it was in the best interests of the country to 
limit the political influence of federal  employees on others as well as on the electoral process); NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (explaining that a private employee’s speech that occurred in the workplace could 
be restricted in a manner that would otherwise be impermissible if it were outside of the workplace setting).  
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employees.”26 The traditional justifications for the principle of content neutrality, including the 
marketplace of ideas theory, also have less force in the context of student speech in public 
schools. Our society’s commitment to freedom of speech must be balanced with the state’s need 
to educate our students, a captive audience whose speech interests in the context of bullying 
legislation must give way to other countervailing concerns.  
Part I of this Note sets out the background of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights 
and presents potential legal challenges to the law. It also discusses the principle of content 
neutrality and applies it to the New Jersey anti-bullying statute. Part II sets out relevant case law 
handed down after the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker and explains the application of the 
content neutrality principle in the public school context. Finally, Part III sets out this Note’s core 
argument and concludes that content-based regulations should be permitted in a state’s regulation 
of bullying in public schools. 
PART I: THE NEW JERSEY ANTI-BULLYING BILL OF RIGHTS ACT AND THE POTENTIAL CHALLENGE 
ON THE BASIS OF CONTENT DISCRIMINATION  
 
A. The New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act 
On November 22, 2010, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Anti-Bullying Bill of 
Rights Act with overwhelming support in both houses.
27
 The legislation became effective on 
September 1, 2011.
28
 The law was enacted after a number of studies were conducted on the 
effects and prevalence of bullying. The legislative findings specifically reference but do not cite 
a 2009 study by the United States Department of Justice and Education which reported that 
thirty-two percent of students ages twelve through eighteen were bullied during the prior school 
year. Further, the study found that twenty-five percent of the public schools that responded to the 
                                                        
26 Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 159 (Cal. 1999). 
27 Anti-Bullying, NEW JERSEY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (last visited January 12, 2013), http://www.njea.org/issues-
and-political-action/anti-bullying.  
28 Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1 (West 2010).  
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survey indicated that bullying was an issue on a daily or weekly basis within their schools.
29
 
Media coverage of bullying-related suicides was also a catalyst for the anti-bullying statute. The 
legislative findings acknowledge that the “chronic persistence of school bullying ha[d] led to 
student suicides across the country, including in New Jersey.”30 
The declared intent by the New Jersey Legislature in enacting the anti-bullying law was 
to “strengthen the standards and procedures for preventing, reporting, investigating, and 
responding to incidents of harassment, intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school 
and off school premises.”31 The statute did indeed strengthen New Jersey’s existing anti-bullying 
law by implementing extensive training programs for school staff along with speedy response 
methods for bullying incidents, among other changes.  
The law’s co-sponsor, state senate majority leader Barbara Buono, called it “a powerful 
message to every child in New Jersey.”32 However, the initial response to the new anti-bullying 
law was mixed. Many perceived it as legally problematic for the state and public school 
administrators due to potential constitutional infirmities. One school psychologist perceived it as 
“empowering children to use the term ‘bullying’ and to speak up for themselves and for 
others.”33 Some advocate that the New Jersey law should become a model anti-bullying law for 
other states.
34
 Critics of the law, however, believe that it is too onerous for teachers and too 
                                                        
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey’s Antibullying Law Should be a Model for Other States, TIME MAG. (Sept. 6, 
2011), available at http://ideas.time.com/2011/09/06/why-new-jerseys-antibullying-law-should-be-a-model-for-
other-states/.  
33 Perez Pena, supra note 12. 
34 Cohen, supra note 32. 
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burdensome on the financially restrained budgets of New Jersey school districts.
35
 Initially, the 
anti-bullying statute did not provide any funds for its implementation.
36
 After the law was 
challenged as an unfunded mandate, Governor Christie signed amendments that appropriated $1 
million in grants to maintain the law’s constitutionality.37  
B. The Principle of Content Neutrality  
Among the strongest potential constitutional challenges to the New Jersey anti-bullying 
law is a violation of the First Amendment principle of content neutrality. The Supreme Court has 
made clear the government cannot regulate speech based on its content.
38
 The content neutrality 
principle has been labeled the “most pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free 
expression.”39 Under this doctrine, a law is content-based if its application is contingent on the 
speech’s message–whether it is the subject matter of the message or the viewpoint the message 
expresses. When a regulation is impermissibly content-based, courts will apply the strict scrutiny 
standard of review.
40
 To achieve content neutrality, the government must regulate speech in both 
a subject-matter and a viewpoint neutral manner.
41
 
                                                        
35 See John F. McKeon, Commentary: Thanks to Gov. Christie, New Jersey’s Suburban School Districts are Getting 
$492 Million Less, NEWSROOM N.J. (July 14, 2011, 11:36 AM), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/commentary/thanks-to-gov-christie-new-jerseys-suburban-school-districts-
are-getting-492-million-less; Charles Hack, Hudson County School Districts Complain Christie’s Funding for Anti-
Bullying Initiative Doesn’t Go Very Far, NJ.COM (July 12, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/jjournal-
weeklies/index.ssf/2012/07/hudson_county_school_districts.html (indicating that the Hoboken school district only 
received $154 for the implementation of its anti-bullying efforts). 
36 New Jersey Not Fully Funding Schools for Reimbursements to Implement Anti-Bullying Legislation, NAT’L SCH. 
BD. ASS’N (July 12, 2012), http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=15307.  
37 Surveys conducted regarding the financial and staffing impacts of the law on school districts revealed that more 
than $2 million was actually spent by school districts in 2011-2012 to implement it. There remains to be seen 
whether the law will once again be challenged as an unfunded state mandate. Governor Signs Anti-Bullying 
Amendments, N.J. SCH. BDS. ASS’N (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.njsba.org/sb_notes/20120327/hib.html.  
38 Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).  
39 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189 (1983). 
40 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). See also Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (“Where a government restricts the speech of a private 
person, the state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn 
means of serving a compelling state interest.”). 
41 Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality As A Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme 
Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000). 
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Subject-matter discrimination occurs when the government targets speech because of the 
subject or topic it addresses.
42
 Viewpoint discrimination is “discrimination because of the 
speaker's specific motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective.”43 At times, these two categories 
overlap, and the Court itself has admitted that the distinction between the two is not precise.
44
 
The Supreme Court’s concern with content-based discrimination is that the government, 
through its regulation of speech, will “suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the 
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”45 The principle of content neutrality 
requires that the government be a neutral arbiter in regulating speech. Federal, state and local 
governments therefore cannot take sides in the public debate. 
In the Supreme Court decision of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court made clear that the 
principle of content neutrality applies even when the government is regulating unprotected 
speech.
46
 The city of St. Paul, Minnesota, enacted a law which made it a misdemeanor to place 
on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization, or graffiti–including 
a burning cross, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know “arouses anger, alarm or 
resent in other on the basis of race, color, creed religion or gender.”47 The defendant moved to 
dismiss the charge against him on the basis that the ordinance was content-based and thus invalid 
on its face.
48
 
                                                        
42 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 (1995). 
43 Id. at 820. 
44 See id. at 830. 
45 Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 641. 
46 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (“These areas of speech can, consistently with the First 
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not 
that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for 
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”) (emphasis in original). 
47 Id. at 380. The ordinance stated, “Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. 
48 Id. The defendant and several teenagers were charged under the ordinance for burning a cross inside the yard of a 
Black family. Id. at 379. 
 10 
The Supreme Court found the St. Paul ordinance facially unconstitutional for a number of 
reasons.
 49
 Namely, the ordinance did not apply to all fighting words – a category of unprotected 
speech; it only applied to those that insult or provoke violence on the basis of certain 
characteristics such as race, color, creed, religion or gender.
50
 The regulation of this speech was 
based on its topic and was therefore subject-matter based. Other displays were permissible under 
the ordinance if they did not fall within these specified categories.
51
 To illustrate the application 
of the content neutrality principle to unprotected speech, the Court explained that even though 
the government is permitted to restrict all libel, it could not proscribe only libel critical of the 
government.
52
 The ordinance was also impermissibly viewpoint based, as it only punished 
fighting words that involved these certain categories.
 53
 
C. The Challenge to New Jersey’s Law Under R.A.V.’s Content Neutrality Principle 
As stated by the majority in R.A.V., content discrimination of speech is present when the 
regulation or policy discriminates against speech on the basis of the speaker’s message.54 
Whether a regulation is content neutral depends on whether the speech regulation is imposed to 
restrict the topic or viewpoint being discussed. When a regulation is content-based, the courts 
will apply strict scrutiny.
55
  
In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the city chose to prosecute the defendants under the Bias-Motivated 
Crime Ordinance. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia explained that the city had “sufficient 
means at its disposal to prevent [the defendant’s] behavior without adding the First Amendment 
                                                        
49 Id. at 381. 
50 Id. at 378. 
51 Id. at 391. The Court gave the examples of other categories such as “political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality” that could be used as fighting words but were not covered by the ordinance at issue. 
52 R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 384.  
53 Chemerinsky, supra note 42 (explaining that viewpoint neutrality does not permit the government to regulate 
speech due to its ideology). 
54 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 (1995). 
55 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).  
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to the fire.”56 The New Jersey anti-bullying statute may also be challenged for opening the door 
to First Amendment challenges on the basis of content-discrimination.  
The definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying in the New Jersey Anti-Bullying 
Bill of Rights Act is very broad: the categories it enumerates characterize it as content-based on 
its face. The law restricts: 
“any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic communication, 
whether it be a single incident or a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as 
being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, 
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and 
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by another distinguishing 
characteristic, that takes place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a 
school bus, or off school grounds . . . that substantially disrupts or interferes with the 
orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students.”57 
With the inclusion of the phrase, “substantially disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation 
of the school or the rights of other students,” the law is punishing unprotected speech that falls 
under the Tinker framework. Thus, the law is punishing speech that is unprotected under the First 
Amendment. 
However, as demonstrated below, the New Jersey anti-bullying law, rather than 
restricting all speech that is proscribed under Tinker, or all speech that “substantially disrupts or 
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students,” selectively 
punishes certain unprotected student speech based upon the listener’s reaction to the speech and 
upon certain characteristics of the victim. 
58
 
a. Subject Matter Discrimination 
                                                        
56 Id.  
57 Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010). 
58 Id. 
 12 
In R.A.V., individuals who used fighting words in the context of ideas outside of the 
ordinance’s enumerated categories would not be punished.59 The majority provided examples of 
other characteristics such as, “political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality” that 
could be used as fighting words but that were not covered by the local law.
 60
  To some extent, 
the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights is similar to the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V., as it 
punishes bullying that may cause a substantial disruption only on the basis of certain motivating 
characteristics.
61
 By enumerating particular categories, namely “race, color, religion, ancestry, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical 
or sensory disability,” the New Jersey legislature may be challenged for committing the same 
error as the city of St. Paul.
62
 The New Jersey anti-bullying law is therefore seemingly punishing 
student speech on the basis of the subject matter or topic in its message.  
After listing specific characteristics, the New Jersey legislature also added the phrase “or 
by another distinguishing characteristic.”63 This additional wording suggests that the legislature 
attempted to remain content-neutral and therefore within the bounds of R.A.V. While this catch 
all provision may be intended to alleviate any concerns related to content discrimination, it may 
not save the statute from constitutional challenge. A potential challenger to this anti-bullying 
statute could argue that the state is targeting certain categories of substantial disruption or 
interference and leaving out others even with the use of this catch-all phrase. 
A challenger could argue that the law nonetheless discriminates on the basis of subject 
matter. For instance, the phrase “distinguishing characteristic” may not reach bullying that is 
                                                        
59 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 378 (“[D]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are 
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.”). 
60 Id. at 391. 
61 Id.  
62 § 18A:37-14. 
63 Id. 
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motivated by certain viewpoints held by a victimized student. Consider a student who is 
subjected to bullying by her peers due to her pro-choice beliefs. Is the student’s pro-choice 
viewpoint is a “distinguishing characteristic?” If school officials perceive it as such, the bully 
can be punished. If not, a student who bullies a peer who holds pro-choice viewpoints will not be 
punished, whereas a student who victimizes another student for his or her pro-life beliefs can be 
punished, as long as the victim’s pro-life stance stems from his or her religious beliefs–a 
characteristic enumerated in the statute. Therefore, the phrase “any other distinguishing 
characteristic” does not alleviate the concerns of content discrimination associated with the 
statute. 
a. Communicative Impact 
The New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights may also be challenged as content-based 
because it regulates student speech based on its effect on the listener. In other words, it restricts 
speech on the basis of its communicative impact. In the Third Circuit case of Saxe v. State 
College Area School District, the plaintiffs challenged a school district’s anti-harassment policy 
on First Amendment grounds. The school argued that the anti-harassment law’s application to 
the students’ expressive conduct was justified as a regulation of the speech’s secondary effects 
and therefore an exception to the content neutrality principle of R.A.V. The Third Circuit rejected 
this argument on the grounds that the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he emotive impact of 
speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’”64 
The New Jersey statute requires that the speech substantially disrupt or interfere with the 
operation of the school or the rights of other students.
65
 It also requires that the restricted speech 
be that which “a reasonable person should know, under the circumstances, will have the effect of 
                                                        
64 Id. at 209 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 484 U.S. 312, 321 (year)). 
65 Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, ch. 122, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010). 
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physically or emotionally harming a student or . . . placing a student in reasonable fear of . . . 
emotional harm to his person.”66 It also requires that the speech have the “effect of insulting or 
demeaning any student or group of students.”67 This terminology indicates that the statute aims 
to regulate a bully’s speech because of its emotive impact on the victim. Since the law punishes 
speech based on its communicative impact on the listener, it raises constitutional concerns on the 
basis of content neutrality. 
PART II: THE APPLICATION OF THE CONTENT NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
REGULATING STUDENT SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS  
Where a student’s independent speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others,” courts are divided on whether the 
regulation on such speech must be content neutral. The confusion on this issue arose from 
contradicting and confusing Supreme Court precedent beginning with the landmark case of 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
68
 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker made clear that “[f]irst Amendment rights, 
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers 
and students.”69 In Tinker, officials of a public school adopted a policy prohibiting students from 
wearing armbands to school.
70
 The officials enacted this policy after they were informed that a 
group of high school students was planning on wearing black armbands to school in protest of 
the Vietnam War. When the students decided to wear the armbands, they were suspended.
71
 The 
                                                        
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
69 Id. at 506. 
70 Id. at 504. 
71 Id.  
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students argued that their First Amendment rights had been violated and sought an injunction 
restraining the school from disciplining them.
72
 
The Supreme Court agreed with the students and adopted a balancing approach 
previously employed by the Fifth Circuit.
73
 The Court declared that a school cannot punish the a 
student’s speech unless it “‘materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of 
others.”74 The majority reasoned that a substantial disruption or a material interference could not 
have been reasonably “forecast” by the school officials.75 Indeed, no actual disruption of 
interference occurred as the discussion of the armbands did not interfere with work inside the 
classroom.
76
 
Following Tinker, most courts have focused on the first prong of the substantial 
disruption test. Whether a student’s speech “collides with the rights of others” has not earned 
much attention.
77
 Although the Tinker standard was framed in the disjunctive, the second prong 
alone has seldom been relied upon. Some courts have refused to apply the second prong due to 
the Supreme Court’s failure to define or clarify what it meant by the phrase “rights of others.”78 
In later cases, the Court narrowed the extent of Tinker’s reach. 
The Supreme Court in Tinker also addressed the issue of content neutrality in the context 
of regulating student speech. The school policy prohibiting only black armbands was especially 
                                                        
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 505. 
74 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
75 Id. at 514. 
76 Id. 
77 Daniel B. Weddle, You’re On Your Own Kid . . . But You Shouldn’t Be, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (2010). 
78 Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children's Rights "Collide": Free Speech vs. the Right to Be Let Alone in the 
Context of Off-Campus "Cyber-Bullying", 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 210 (2011) (citing J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills 
Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Court is not aware of any authority . . . that 
extends the Tinker rights of others prong so far as to hold that a school may regulate any speech that may cause 
some emotional harm to a student. This Court declines to be the first.”).  
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problematic to the Court because it was content-based. Instead of banning all armbands that were 
political or controversial, the school banned only those that conveyed a certain message.
79
 The 
Court pointed out that some of the students wore buttons with Nazi symbols, but those 
viewpoints were not prohibited.
80
 In effect, the students’ expression–opposition to the war in 
Vietnam–was “singled out” by the school officials for punishment. The Court stated that such 
viewpoint discrimination, “without evidence that it is necessary to avoid a substantial 
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”81 Some 
commentators argue that this statement by the Court seemingly acknowledged that the 
prohibition of a particular opinion could be justified as long as it amounted to a material 
disruption under Tinker’s framework.82 In other words, content discrimination could be 
permissible under such circumstances. 
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Over fifteen years after the Tinker decision, the Supreme Court again confronted an issue 
of student speech in public schools. In Fraser, a student was suspended for delivering a speech at 
a high school assembly.
83
 Although the district court and the court of appeals both struck down 
                                                        
79 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11. 
80 Id. at 510. 
81 Id. at 511. 
82 See Alexis Zouhary, The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for Applying Viewpoint Neutrality 
to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2227, 2237-38 (“Justice Fortas' 
libertarian tone causes some to overlook the Court's intimation that certain viewpoint-based regulations may be 
constitutionally valid in the school setting . . . the Court presumptively concede[d] that, in certain circumstances, the 
state can regulate speech on the basis of viewpoint.”); See also Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School 
Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 657, 663 (“[E]ven in applying a speech-
protective standard in Tinker, the Court was sensitive to the fact that schools are not primarily designed for speech, 
and that normal free speech standards might need to be modified, though not abandoned altogether, in the school 
context.”). 
83 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); In his speech, the student stated, “I know a 
man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm - but most of all, his belief in you, 
the students of Bethel is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts, he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he 
succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax - for each and every one of you. So vote for 
Jeff for ASB vice president - he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.” Brief for 
Petitioners, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (No. 84-1667), 3. 
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the suspension on the basis that there was no substantial disruption or material interference under 
Tinker, the Supreme Court placed great emphasis on granting the state and its educators more 
leeway to curtail “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive speech” in schools.84 Unlike the lower 
courts, the Supreme Court did not apply the “substantial disruption” test from Tinker. The Court 
found the student’s language to be “offensively lewd and indecent speech,” and upheld his 
suspension.
 85
 In effect, speech in public schools that is “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive” is 
seemingly carved out as an exception to the Tinker analysis.
86
 
Most importantly, the Court in Fraser closely examined what the majority in Tinker 
merely touched upon–the mission of public education and the tension that arises when trying to 
balance students’ free speech rights with the interests of the state and local government in its role 
as an educator.
87
 When the Court wrote that a student’s constitutional rights are “not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” it clarified that the legal 
analytical framework established in Tinker is not absolute.
 88
 As the Court later explained in 
Morse v. Frederick, “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school 
context, it would have been protected.”89 However, since “the State has interests in teaching high 
school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of 
educational school activities,” the Supreme Court permitted more restrictive speech regulations 
within the school setting.
90
  
                                                        
84 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
85 Id. at 685. 
86 Id. at 683. 
87 See Part III for a discussion on the importance of the state’s role as educator and its countervailing interests in 
educating our youth.    
88 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
89 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
90 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring); See e.g., Zouhary, supra note 83 at 2239. 
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the analysis it utilized in Fraser “is not 
entirely clear.”91 Lower courts have interpreted Fraser as standing for the proposition that there 
is no First Amendment protection for “lewd,” “vulgar,” “indecent or offensive speech” in 
schools.
92
 When dealing with the regulation of this particular type of student speech, courts apply 
a reasonableness standard that grants more deference to schools. 
In terms of the content neutrality principle, the Court indicated that no content 
discrimination was present because the school did not suspend the student to curtail the 
viewpoint he expressed.
93
 Rather, the school punished the offensive mode of expression or the 
manner in which Fraser delivered the speech.
94
 The Court pointed out that this case was different 
from Tinker, which involved core speech and the suppression of a political viewpoint.
95
 
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
The Supreme Court moved further away from Tinker in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.
96
 In that case, the school district censored two student-authored articles on teenage 
pregnancy and divorce for the school newspaper.
 97
 They were censored on grounds that they 
involved inappropriate subjects.
98
 The students’ challenge of the suspension on First Amendment 
grounds did not succeed. The Court drew a distinction between independent student speech, 
which is subject to the Tinker test, and school-sponsored speech. Instead of applying Tinker’s 
substantial disruption test, the Court applied a reasonableness standard to school-sponsored 
                                                        
91 Morse, 551 U.S. at 404. 
92 Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 at 678-80. 
93 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. (“Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties 
imposed in this case were unrelated to any political viewpoint.”). 
94 Id. at 681.  
95 Id. 
96 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
97 Id. at 262-64. 
98 Id. 
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speech that could be perceived as bearing the “imprimatur of the school.”99 School-sponsored 
activities are those that “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or 
not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.”100  
The Court announced that schools can exercise control over the “style and content of 
student speech in school-sponsored activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”101 In applying this reasonableness standard, the majority held 
the censorship was not an infringement on the students’ First Amendment rights. Due to the 
schools’ valid pedagogical interest to regulate the content of these publications, the Court 
concluded that the school’s interest in regulating the curriculum outweighed the students’ interest 
in expressing themselves
102
  
The majority opinion did not address content neutrality, even though it was discussed in 
the parties’ briefs and during oral argument before the Court.103 However, Justice Brennan’s 
dissent did address the issue. He accused the school officials’ and the Court of “camouflage[ing] 
viewpoint discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics.”104 At least 
two commentators have suggested that some of the Justices were simply not satisfied with the 
content neutrality requirement’s implications for school-sponsored speech and therefore the 
Court did not address it in the majority opinion.
105
 They point to the questions asked by the 
                                                        
99 Id. at 270-73.  
100 Id. at 271. 
101 Id. at 273. 
102 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 275-76. 
103 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (No. 86-836). 
104 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
105 Kouhary, supra note 83 at 2244 (suggesting that Justices were seemingly uncomfortable with the viewpoint 
neutrality requirement’s Catch-22 implications on school-sponsored speech); Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining 
Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in Student Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
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Justices during oral argument. For instance, Justice Scalia posed the following question about 
viewpoint discrimination to the attorney for the school district: 
The principal could not exclude an article that discussed teenage sexuality and 
pregnancy of some of his students, and portrayed the whole thing in a favorable 
light--in effect, sanctioning promiscuity by the students--but permit an article that 
discussed the same topic, but seemed to frown upon that kind of activity. The 
principal could not take a position on a subject like that. If he allows sexuality to 
be talked about, he has to allow both the pros and the cons of adolescent sex to be 
set forth. Is that right?
106
 
 
Due to the Supreme Court’s evasiveness on the First Amendment content neutrality 
principle’s application on the regulation of student speech, a circuit split emerged in the lower 
courts. The Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits maintain that the content neutrality principle 
still applies in the school context.
107
 On the other hand, both the First and Tenth Circuits permit 
content-based regulations of student speech.
108
 In the later student speech case of Morse v. 
Frederick, the Supreme Court again conveniently avoided directly addressing the content 
discrimination issue present in the context of regulating student speech.  
D. Morse v. Frederick 
In Morse, a student was suspended from school for refusing to remove a banner that read 
“BONG HiTS for JESUS” that he was displaying at a school-sponsored event across the street 
from his high school.
 109
 The Ninth Circuit applied the substantial disruption analysis from 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
REV. 217, 227 (2004) (indicating that some of the Justices may have been reluctant to include explicit abandonment 
of the viewpoint neutrality requirement in the student speech context). 
106 Transcript of Hazelwood Oral Arguments, in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1987 TERM SUPPLEMENT 385, 391 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., 1989). 
107 Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 629-33 (2d Cir. 2005); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of 
Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004). 
108 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir. 1993); Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 
926-27 (10th Cir. 2002); See Kouhary, supra note 83 at 2244-45 (discussing the resulting circuit split after 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier). 
109 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 21 
Tinker and ruled that the school’s actions violated the student’s free speech rights.110 The 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed. Concluding that the poster was not school-
sponsored speech and that the reasonableness standard of Kulmeier did not apply, the Court 
analyzed the issue under a different framework. Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion shaped 
the issue as “whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student 
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.”111 Essentially, the Court carved out an exception for drug-specific student speech. 
The Court reasoned that the “‘special characteristics of the school environment’ and the 
government interest in stopping student drug use . . . allow schools to restrict student expression 
that . . . promot[ed] illegal drug use.”112 The majority’s analysis of the narrower issue placed 
great emphasis on the harms of illegal drug abuse, stating, “[d]rug abuse by the Nation’s youth is 
a serious problem. . . . Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating students 
about the dangers of drug abuse . . . [] and many [] schools have adopted policies aimed at 
implementing this message.”113 The Court indicated that the danger in this case – promoting 
illegal drug use among students – was “far more serious and palpable” than a simple desire by 
school officials to suppress an unpopular viewpoint.
114
 The majority pointed to Congress’s 
pronouncement that schools must “educat[e] students about the dangers of illegal drug use.” 115 
For these reasons, the government was reasonably restricting student speech to “protect those 
entrusted to their care.”116 
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115 Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. 
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The dissenting justices criticized the majority for permitting school officials to prohibit 
certain viewpoints in the school context. Specifically, the dissent noted that the school punished 
the unpopular viewpoint of promoting student drug use during the national war on drugs.
117
 
Although content discrimination was in fact present, the majority and concurring justices 
emphasized the fact that the speech at issue was not political discourse.
118
 The concurring 
justices made clear that they would not have upheld the suspension if the school had targeted 
speech with a political message. Specifically, Justice Alito wrote: 
“I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (1) it goes no further 
than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer 
would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (2) it provides no support for 
any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any 
political or social issue.” 
 
The concurrence clarified that the punishment at issue was constitutional because illegal 
drug use amongst students was a unique threat to students’ physical safety.119 In its briefs, the 
school district argued that the First Amendment permitted it to “censor any student speech that 
interferes with a school’s educational mission.”120 The concurring justices rejected this argument 
for broad authority, warning that the “educational mission” argument would grant school boards 
and officials the dangerous pass to curtail political speech on the basis of viewpoint 
discrimination.
121
 Notably, the concurrence reiterated the majority’s reasoning when they warned 
that any argument for limiting the free speech standards in public schools would have to be 
                                                        
117 Id. at 447-8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
118 The majority wrote, “not even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or religious message. 
. . . this is plainly not a case about political debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession.” Id. at 403.  
119 Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
121 Id. (Alito, J. concurring). 
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grounded in “some special characteristic of the school setting.”122 In Morse, the majority 
perceived the unique threat to students’ physical safety to be the special characteristic present.123  
E. Current Complexity of the Student Speech Standards and the Resulting Circuit Split
124
 
In R.A.V., the Court explained that content discrimination is impermissible for any type 
of speech restriction, including restrictions on unprotected speech.
125
 Nonetheless, the question 
of whether the First Amendment principle of content neutrality applies to independent student 
speech that is proscribable under Tinker’s substantial disruption standard remains unclear. 
The Tinker decision and the Supreme Court cases on student speech that followed it 
demonstrate that independent student speech in public schools is analyzed under Tinker and can 
therefore only be regulated if it meets the substantial disruption test. However, this test does not 
apply if the facts of the case fall within one of three categories.
126
 The Fraser decision carved out 
the first exception to the Tinker standard by permitting schools to constitutionally restrict 
students’ speech when the speech is “vulgar,” “lewd, indecent or offensive and would undermine 
the school’s educational mission.127 Second, the Kuhlmeier decision allows schools to regulate 
school-sponsored speech as long as the school’s actions meet a reasonableness test. Their actions 
must be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”128 Lastly, Tinker does not apply 
to student speech that may “reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”129  
 
                                                        
122 Morse, 551 U.S. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Due to the Court’s lack of unambiguous analysis or pertinent discussion regarding 
content discrimination or R.A.V. in the student speech cases that followed Tinker, a circuit split 
occurred in the lower courts surrounding whether the principle of content neutrality applies in the 
realm of regulating student speech.
130
 At least one commentator has suggested that the Supreme 
Court’s decision to not discuss R.A.V. in Morse v. Frederick indicates “either the Court does not 
deem R.A.V. applicable to the school setting or that R.A.V.'s precedential value is minimal in that 
context.”131 
PART III: CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE RELAXED IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ANTI-BULLYING STATUTES 
 
Even if the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights and similar anti-bullying laws pose a 
content discrimination issue under R.A.V., schools should be granted more leeway to regulate 
bullying–a danger to students– when it substantially disrupts the educational environment. 
Supreme Court precedent since its landmark student speech case in Tinker is contradictory and 
unclear. Most importantly, the Court has narrowed its Tinker holding by carving out a number of 
exceptions.
132
 Although the Court in R.A.V. seemed to require the application of strict scrutiny to 
all content-based speech regulations, the unique conditions of the school setting and the state’s 
role as educator both necessitate an alternate approach to restrictions on speech that constitutes 
bullying. Supreme Court precedent indicates the Court has been reluctant to apply R.A.V. and 
strict scrutiny to content-based regulations of student speech since Tinker.
133
 This indicates that 
                                                        
130 For a discussion of the circuit split before Morse v. Frederick, see Zouhary, supra note 83 at 2244-47. Zouhary 
also points out that the decision in Morse confused the lower courts further. Her Note argues that the content-
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the principle of content neutrality should not be applied with the same rigor to evaluate 
regulations on student speech that involve bullying.  
To comprehend the current status of First Amendment jurisprudence in public schools, 
we must take into account two recurring premises in the Supreme Court’s decisions since Tinker. 
The Supreme Court has continuously acknowledged the interests of the state, local government, 
and school officials in carrying out the educational mission of their schools. The Court’s 
opinions indicate that certain regulations on student speech in schools are permissible in order to 
carry out this unique mission. In addition, the Court since Tinker has also stated that schools are 
a forum for the marketplace of ideas,
 
a rationale for content neutrality that many argue has less 
force in the context of public schools.
134 
The Court has placed particular emphasis on political 
speech within the marketplace 
A. The Role of States and Local Governments as Educators 
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court’s precedent has acknowledged the interests of the states 
and local governments, including school officials, in carrying out their educational mission. As 
one commentator explained, “education transmits more than information. . . . It is the indivisible 
process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and dispositions that are our windows on the world, that 
mediate and filter our experience of it, and that govern our evaluation and judgment of it.”135 
Chief Justice Warren once wrote “[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
                                                        
134 KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 243 (2003) (stating that although 
this concern is more pressing at the university level of education, precedent shows that it is also relevant at the 
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education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
society . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”136  
a. Supreme Court Precedent  
The Supreme Court has recognized that public schools serve as “principal instrument[s]” 
in introducing children to cultural values, in preparing them for their future professional careers, 
and in assisting them to appropriately adjust to the environment beyond the schoolhouse gate.
137
 
The Court has stressed the significance of public schools “in the preparation of individuals for 
participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests.”138 The 
Court has consistently acknowledged that our schools are places where we establish our 
“fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” and for 
teaching the “shared values of a civilized social order.”139 The process of public education is a 
process of citizenship, and the Court has indicated that it is not one “confined to books, the 
curriculum, and the civics class.”140 More importantly, the civic education process encompasses 
teaching by example. Therefore, schools are responsible for teaching the “shared values of a 
civilized social order.”141  
The case law demonstrates that the perception of the government’s unique role as 
educator was continuously echoed in student speech cases following Tinker. The majority in 
Tinker expressed the concern that permitting schools to silence student political expression that 
was not disruptive could lead schools to become “enclaves of totalitarianism.”142 Justice Black’s 
dissent rejected this concern, and stressed that the Constitution does not compel our “teachers, 
                                                        
136 Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
137 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
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parents and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to 
public school students.”143  
The Court in Fraser reiterated Justice Black’s concern for the execution of the state’s 
educational mission. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, wrote that “the 
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate 
properly rests with the school board” rather than with judges. 144 The Court also acknowledged 
that a student’s freedom to express an unpopular and controversial viewpoint in the context of a 
school “must be balanced against [] society's countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” More importantly, the Court wrote that a student’s 
constitutional rights are “not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”145  
In Kuhlmeier, the Court again echoed these ideas. In quoting Fraser, the Court clarified 
that a school does not have to accept student speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic 
educational mission.’”146 Schools are permitted to regulate such speech despite the fact that the 
government could not censor similar speech in a different context. The Court made clear that a 
student’s First Amendment claims must be considered in this unique context. In Morse v. 
Frederick, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Fraser’s declaration that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings” in light of the “special characteristics of the school environment.”147 Concurring in the 
judgment, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Court, “continue[s] to distance [itself] from 
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Tinker, but [it] neither overrule[s] it nor offer[s] an explanation of when it operates and when it 
does not.”148  
The Supreme Court’s precedent at least indicates that the principle of content neutrality 
does not apply with the same rigor in the realm of student speech when the speech at issue 
collides with the school’s “educational mission.”149 As one commentator has suggested, the 
Court has had numerous opportunities to finally clarify this exact issue yet it has chosen not to 
do so.
150
 Accordingly, many lower courts have reinforced the “educational mission” rationale to 
permit content discrimination in the regulation of student speech.  
b. Lower Court Precedent 
Subsequent cases in the lower courts have echoed the importance of the role of the state 
as educator and the deference that should be granted to a government’s judgment in fulfilling 
that role.
151
 The Third Circuit case of Sypniewski v. Warren Hills is arguably the most illustrative 
example of a court granting the state the necessary flexibility for executing its educational 
mission. 
The Third Circuit dismissed a content discrimination challenge to an anti-harassment 
policy in a public school on the basis of the school’s unique mission of educating the nation’s 
youth.
152
 The plaintiffs challenged the policy as too narrow because it targeted only racially 
provocative expression for punishment and thereby amounted to content discrimination. The 
plaintiffs argued that although the school district was able to sanction speech that is disruptive 
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under Tinker, R.A.V. did not allow the school to discriminate between disruptive speech that 
embodies racially oriented themes and disruptive speech that does not.
153
 
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the racial harassment policy was content-based and 
would most likely be found unconstitutional under R.A.V. in a different context. However, due to 
the uniqueness of the public school setting and the critical function of the state and local 
governments as educators, the court reasoned it was the government’s responsibility to 
“maintain[] an environment conducive to fulfilling [its] educational mission.”154 The court 
deemed this responsibility, “perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.”155 The decision emphasized a court’s need to defer to the judgments of state and 
local governments as they must be granted flexibility to carry out their educational mission. 
In Sypniewski, the Third Circuit paid “due respect . . . to the needs of school authority,” 
and permitted content discrimination in its racial harassment policy as a result.
 156
  The court 
placed great emphasis on the fact that the school district had identified a certain class of speech – 
racial speech – that was “subject to a well-founded fear of conflict” because of its content.157 The 
school district’s well-founded fear of conflict due to racial harassment was grounded in the 
history of disruption and interference with the legitimate rights of other students. To exercise its 
educational mission and maintain order within the school, the district was permitted to enact 
unambiguous rules of conduct that “narrowly target[ed] the identified problems.”158 
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The court did not engage in R.A.V.’s content discrimination analysis, but it made clear 
that it was “not entirely clear” how it was applied to analysis in this realm of free speech.159 
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit held that “adopting a policy limited to racially provocative speech 
was an acceptable non-discriminatory response by school authorities to the history of race 
relations in Warren Hills schools.”160 In other words, the school district had a legitimate basis to 
enact the formal policy. The court acknowledged that such content discrimination would be 
found unconstitutionally content-based in a context outside of the school setting.
161
 The Third 
Circuit also warned that when a school distinguishes between subclasses of proscribable 
disruptive speech under Tinker on no legitimate basis, the R.A.V. content neutrality principle 
might be implicated on grounds that the school is disfavoring certain view expressed by the 
students.
162
  
The same court later reinforced the substantial leeway granted to school administrators, 
especially in the elementary school setting, when it stated that, “[W]here an elementary school's 
purpose in restricting student speech within an organized and structured educational activity is 
reasonably directed towards preserving its educational goals, we will ordinarily defer to the 
school's judgment.”163  
B. Preventing Bullying is a Reasonable Educational Goal 
To fulfill their roles as educators and carry out their educational missions, states and local 
governments must be granted sufficient leeway to prevent and halt bullying in our public 
schools. As one court indicated, the issue of bullying in American public schools is “pervasive; it 
is perceived by educators as serious, particularly in the middle school years . . . It is the most 
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common type of violence in our schools.”164 More importantly, it is a problem that disturbs a 
student’s “school performance, emotional well-being, mental health, and social development.”165 
In Sypniewski, the Third Circuit stated that intimidating another student, including name-calling, 
was exactly the type of conduct that “schools are expected to control or prevent.”166 In light of 
this, the court quipped that, “[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully.”167  
At the 2010 Federal National Bullying Summit in Washington, D.C., Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan gave the following remarks: “A school where children don’t feel safe is 
a school where children struggle to learn. It is a school where kids drop out, tune out, and get 
depressed.” The Secretary advised that, “[b]ullying is definable” and [g]ood prevention programs 
work to reduce bullying.”168  
a. Empirical Research Findings: Bullying in Public Schools 
The bullying issue made its entrance into the public limelight after the media publicized a 
number of student suicides, including New Jersey’s very own Tyler Clementi.169 Since then, the 
issue has been more elaborately studied, and research findings support what many courts and 
legislatures now acknowledge: bullying is a dangerous impediment to the goals of public 
education. As of this year, approximately forty-eight states have enacted legislation against 
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school speech that constitutes bullying.
170
 In New Jersey, the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act 
was enacted after a year of research on the harms and detrimental effects of bullying in the 
school setting.
171
 Such research has aided states and local governments in drafting and 
implementing their anti-bullying legislation. The findings confirm that bullying in the school 
environment affects both the victims and the bullies’ ability to perform in the classroom, their 
desire to learn, as well as their decisions to attend school on a day-to-day basis. 
The research findings indicate that the bullying issue is pressing and ongoing. Eight 
percent of students miss one day of class per month for fear of encountering a bully.
172
 Every 
seven minutes, a student is bullied on their school’s playground, and 85% of the time, there is no 
intervention by a peer or an adult.
173
 Various studies have found that missing school due to a fear 
of victimization “not only impair[s] academic achievement, but also hinder[s] future financial 
and educational opportunities.”174 Empirical data indicates that bullying is psychologically 
detrimental to both bullies and victims.  
The New Jersey Department of Education’s report on the implementation of the anti-
bullying law explains that bullying generally starts in elementary school, and peaks in sixth 
through eighth grade. It persists throughout high school but it decreases with age.
175
 The 
statistics of the Commissioner’s Annual Report reveal that thirty percent of U.S. students in sixth 
through tenth grade are “involved in moderate or frequent bullying either as bullies, as victims, 
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or as both.”176 In addition, the detrimental effects of bullying on students include serious 
psychological and behavioral effects that manifest themselves in low self-esteem, anxiety, 
depression, suicide, violence and criminal behavior.
177
 
The effects of bullying on academic performance are especially problematic as student 
learning and development is advanced in a school setting where students feel safe. However, 
studies show that a major consequence of bullying behavior is poor grades.
178
 In addition, the 
relationship between students and adults suffers when students witness bullying at school and no 
adult intervention takes place. Students begin to perceive the adults as lacking in control or as 
apathetic to bullying.
179
 Ineffective regulation of bullying in the school environment sends the 
wrong message to students  
Both experience and research show that bullying disturbs the learning environment. As 
Secretary Duncan made clear, “bullying is very much an education priority that goes to the heart 
of school performance and school culture.”180 In accordance with its in loco parentis role as 
educator, the government should be able to combat the bullying problem without grappling with 
the complex issues of remaining content neutral. 
B. Students in Public Schools are a “Captive Audience” 
In addition to the considerations involved when the government acts as educator, 
significant public policy concerns arise in the public school setting because it involves a captive 
audience of students. The Supreme Court has held that since the public workplace environment 
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involves a “captive” audience,181 the important public policies that govern such an environment 
“may justify some limitations on the free speech rights of employers and employees.”182 In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court stated, “[e]ven the most heated political 
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other 
participants and audiences.”183 At least one commentator has concluded that Fraser’s holding 
permitted schools to regulate a student’s mode of expression, and especially lewd and vulgar 
speech that involved a captive audience.
184
 In Fraser, the state had a substantial interest of 
protecting young students from inappropriate material in a setting where they are not voluntary 
participants. 
In Saxe v. State College Area School District and Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional 
Board of Education, the Third Circuit addressed anti-harassment or anti-bullying policies in 
public schools. In that case, a school district’s policy goal was to “provid[e][] all students with a 
safe, secure, and nurturing school environment,” and defined harassment as, “verbal or physical 
conduct based on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of 
substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive environment.”185 The policy also established procedures for the reporting and 
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resolution of complaints. Its non-exhaustive list of punishments for harassment included 
warning, suspension, expulsion, transfer, termination, training, education, or counseling.
186
 Two 
students brought suit challenging the policy on First Amendment grounds and seeking the 
remedy of an injunction. They labeled the policy a “hate speech code" and alleged it was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The students believed they were likely to be punished 
under the policy for speaking out about their religious beliefs, engaging in symbolic activities 
relaying those beliefs, and distributing religious literature.
187
 
The Third Circuit acknowledged that First Amendment concerns are raised when laws or 
policies against harassment regulate written or oral expression.
188
 Harassment statutes that 
punish solely “verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter” impose content-based viewpoint 
discriminatory restrictions on speech and must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny.
189
 The court 
clarified that although a tension exists between anti-harassment laws and the First Amendment’s 
content neutrality principle, the prevention of discrimination in the school setting was certainly a 
compelling governmental interest that could possibly overcome a content discrimination 
challenge.
190
 The court further suggested that speech may be more proscribable when the 
audience is “captive” and cannot avoid the speech.191 The Third Circuit in Saxe acknowledged 
the school setting as similar to the workplace setting, where the government’s public policy 
interests may outweigh the students’ free speech rights. The Third Circuit did not strike the anti-
harassment policy down on these grounds however. It found it was overbroad because it 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, 
innuendo, gestures, physical contact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or circulation of written 
material or pictures.” Id. 
186 Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
187 Id. at 203-04. 
188 Id. at 206. 
189 Id. 
190 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209. 
191 Id. at 210 (citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 158, 980 P.2d 846, 870 (1999)). 
 36 
restricted “substantially more speech than could be prohibited under Tinker's substantial 
disruption test.”192 
As the Saxe opinion demonstrated, the traditional justifications for the principle of 
content neutrality, including the marketplace of ideas theory, have less force in the public school 
setting. Just as the workplace is not perceived as a forum for the testing of political and social 
ideas, the public school classroom is not a public forum where “teachers, parents and elected 
school officials [] [must] surrender control of the American public school system to public 
school students.”193 Yet many have utilized the marketplace of ideas rationale to support a 
steadfast prohibition on content discrimination. As many courts and commentators have 
recognized, pupils in the secondary school context, unlike adults and students in universities, 
make limited contributions to the marketplace of ideas.
194
 Content-based discrimination is 
deemed problematic because it creates “the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to 
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas . . . or manipulate the 
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion."
195
 In the context of bullying in public 
schools, the regulation of such speech will most likely not curtail the expression of a political 
viewpoint such as Tinker’s. For this reason, among others, there seems less of a concern that 
regulating student speech on the basis of content could lead schools to become “enclaves of 
totalitarianism.”196  
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Our society’s commitment to freedom of speech must be balanced with the government’s 
need to educate our students, who are a captive audience. Students’ free speech interests in the 
context of bullying legislation must give way to other countervailing concerns, especially when 
dealing with punishing student speech that constitutes bullying–a pervasive issue that frustrates 
and impedes the execution of the government’s educational mission. 
CONCLUSION 
At the White House Conference on Bullying Prevention in March 2011, Secretary of 
Education Duncan stated, “I am convinced that we are moving toward a day when students will 
be safe from taunts, teasing, and physical violence in our schools. This work won't be easy. This 
requires a fundamental cultural shift in our schools . . . Bullying is a moral and educational issue. 
It goes to the heart of school performance and the ability of a student to learn.”197 Due to the 
countervailing interest of effectively educating our youth in a safe and conducive environment, 
the principle of content neutrality should not apply or should be relaxed in the context of 
restricting student speech that constitutes bullying. Content discrimination should be permitted in 
this realm of free speech regulation because bullying impedes the state’s ability to exercise its 
role and duty as educator. Further, the school environment involves a “captive” audience similar 
to that of the workplace setting, where the Supreme Court has held that the pressing public 
policies that govern such an environment may justify some limitations on free speech that would 
not be permissible in another context.  
What a student can express through speech that constitutes bullying he or she can also 
express without bullying. The disruptive nature of this type of speech, as well as the state’s 
pressing interest in carrying out its educational mission, are both countervailing interests that 
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should grant educators limited leeway to implement content-based restrictions in their regulation 
of bullying in the public school setting. As one commentator has suggested, “What could be 
more ‘substantially disruptive’ to the smooth functioning of an education institution than 
students who are afraid to come to school or who are miserable once they arrive?”198 
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